

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 176498

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ORIGIN PM-03

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 EB-07 CIAE-00 INR-07 L-03

ACDA-05 NSAE-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 SS-15 NSC-05 DODE-00 ERDA-05 /074 R

DRAFTED BY PM/ISP:ARTURRENTINE:DLJ

APPROVED BY PM - GEORGE S. VEST

EB - MR. BISHOP (SUBS)

DOD/ISA - MGEN BOWMAN (DRAFT)

EUR - MR. LOWENSTEIN (DRAFT)

S/P - MR. KAPLAN (DRAFT)

NSC - MR. HADLEY (DRAFT)

C - MR. SONNENFELDT

S/S:JPMOFFAT

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R 252330Z JUL 75

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TO USMISSION NATO

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 176498

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MCAP, MILI, PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: DEVELOPING A US PLAN OF ACTION FOR ADVANCING  
STANDARDIZATION IN NATO

REF: A. USNATO 3640; B. USNATO 3619 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 176498

THIS MESSAGE IDENTIFIES THE BASES OF US POLICY ON STANDARDI-  
ZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN NATO,  
OUTLINES THE ELEMENTS THAT ARE NECESSARY FOR A SUCCESSFUL  
STANDARDIZATION EFFORT, REVIEWS STANDARDIZATION ACTIVITIES

UNDERWAY, AND PROPOSES A TENTATIVE PROGRAM OF ACTION. US MISSION NATO ANALYSIS (REF A) WAS A VALUABLE INPUT TO THIS EFFORT. THE DISCUSSION CONSTITUTES OUR PRELIMINARY THINKING ONLY. YOUR COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS ARE REQUESTED; COMMENT BY INFORMATION ADDRESSEES IS WELCOME. END SUMMARY.

#### I. BACKGROUND

1. THE US HAS ENDORSED STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN NATO AS A CONTINUING LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE. AT THE RECENT NATO SUMMIT PRESIDENT FORD SAID, QUOTE: A GENERATION AFTER ITS CREATION, THE ALLIANCE

WASTES VAST SUMS EACH YEAR, SACRIFICING MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS. WE HAVE SIMPLY NOT DONE ENOUGH TO STANDARDIZE OUR WEAPONS. WE MUST CORRECT THIS. WE MUST ALSO AGREE AMONG OURSELVES ON A SENSIBLE DIVISION OF WEAPONS-DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND PRODUCTION RESPONSIBILITIES. AND WE MUST DO MORE TO ENHANCE OUR MUTUAL CAPACITY TO SUPPORT EACH OTHER BOTH IN BATTLE AND LOGISTICALLY. THE PRESSURES ON DEFENSE BUDGETS THROUGHOUT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BY NOW HAVE CONVINCED EACH OF US THAT WE SIMPLY MUST RATIONALIZE OUR COLLECTIVE DEFENSE. END QUOTE. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID, QUOTE: WE MUST MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF OUR DEFENSE RESOURCES. WE NEED TO ACHIEVE OUR LONG-STANDING GOALS OF COMMON PROCEDURES AND EQUIPMENT. OUR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS MUST BE MORE THAN THE SUM OF THE INDIVIDUAL PARTS. LET US BECOME TRULY ONE IN OUR ALLOCATION OF DEFENSE TASKS, SUPPORT AND PRODUCTION. END QUOTE.

2. ADDITIONALLY, IN A RECENT POLICY DECISION THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED THAT GREATER EMPHASIS BE GIVEN TO ENCOURAGING OUR NATO ALLIES TO INCREASE THE QUALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR OWN FORCES WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF EXISTING DEFENSE RESOURCES BY REDUCING THE OVERLAP AND DUPLICATION THAT EXIST IN MANY AREAS OF NATO ACTIVITY. THE PRESIDENT HAS FURTHER DIRECTED THAT EFFORTS BE FOCUSED  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 176498

ON INCREASING THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO'S OVERALL DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

3. IN HIS FIRST REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON STANDARDIZATION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN NATO, SECDEF SAID THAT A PRIORITY GOAL OF THE UNITED STATES DEFENSE POLICY IS TO MAINTAIN A STALWART NATO CONVENTIONAL COMBAT CAPABILITY AS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF THE NATO TRIAD AND THAT STANDARDIZATION OF EQUIPMENT TOGETHER WITH OTHER RATIONALIZATION MEASURES PROVIDES THE ONLY FEASIBLE MEANS TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE, GIVEN PRESENT BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS.

4. AT THE DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING, MAY 22-23, 1975, SECDEF EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR NATO TO CREATE NEW INSTITUTIONS CAPABLE OF CONSIDERING THE DESIRABLE FORCE STRUCTURES AND RELATED REQUIREMENTS FIVE TO SEVEN YEARS AHEAD, AND IDENTIFYING PROPER OBJECTIVES FOR INITIATIVES IN STANDARDIZATION. SECDEF STRESSED THAT THE OBJECTIVE IS NOT STANDARDIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION'S SAKE, BUT INCREASED MILITARY COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AND LOWER UNIT COSTS FOR THE ALLIANCE.

5. FROM THE FOREGOING AND EARLIER STATEMENTS OF US POLICY, IT IS CLEAR THAT STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY IN

NATO ARE PRIORITY GOALS IN SUPPORT OF US POLICY. AS A FIRST PRINCIPLE WE ARE NOT SEEKING STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY FOR THEIR OWN SAKE, BUT RATHER TO ACHIEVE MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF RESOURCES AND ENHANCE COMBAT CAPABILITY, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A VIABLE NATO CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT OVER THE LONG-TERM. TO THIS END WE SHOULD STRESS STANDARDIZATION IN THE NATO FORCE PLANNING PROCESS AND RATIONALIZATION OF THE NATO-WIDE WEAPONS PRODUCTION BASE WITH A VIEW TOWARD ELIMINATING UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION IN RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT, AND TO ENSURE THAT THE NATO FORCES CAN FIGHT EFFECTIVELY TOGETHER.

## II. THE ESSENTIAL BASES FOR STANDARDIZATION

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 176498

6. PROGRESS TOWARD STANDARDIZATION WILL REQUIRE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN NATIONAL ATTITUDES AND DECISION PROCESSES. MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO REACH A CONSENSUS ON THE FOLLOWING IMPORTANT ELEMENTS:

A. MILITARY IMPACT. IF THE ALLIED FORCES ARE TO ACHIEVE AN IMPROVED CAPABILITY TO FIGHT TOGETHER, TO PRESENT A COHESIVE FRONT, AND RESPOND TO THE DYNAMIC MILITARY THREAT, THEY MUST SEEK IMPROVEMENTS IN STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY. WE SHOULD SEEK TO STANDARDIZE WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT SO THAT INTEROPERABILITY IS MAXIMIZED, ESPECIALLY IN THE CENTER REGION. THERE FORCES OF SEVERAL ALLIES COULD BE INTERMIXED AND FORCED TO OPERATE TOGETHER IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR PENETRATION BY THE WARSAW PACT. IF THEIR EQUIPMENT WERE INTEROPERABLE AND THEY COULD SUPPORT ONE ANOTHER, THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO REGROUP TOGETHER MORE EFFECTIVELY. IN ANY CASE, WE SHOULD STRIVE FOR INTEROPERABILITY IN SUCH AREAS AS COMMON FUELS, AMMUNITION, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, COMPATIBLE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, ETC. IN BOTH NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN FLANKS SOME DEGREE OF INTEROPERABILITY IS IMPORTANT TO FACILITATE THE OPERATION OF NATO IMMEDIATE REACTION AND

MAJOR REINFORCEMENT FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE REGION. IN SEA OPERATIONS, BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO OBTAIN THE MAXIMUM DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE UTILIZATION OF NAVAL FORCES, INTEROPERABILITY AND, WHERE APPLICABLE, STANDARDIZATION ARE ESSENTIAL IF ALLIED NAVIES ARE TO IMPROVE THEIR COMBINED COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.

B. ECONOMIC IMPACT. THE ECONOMIC PAYOFF FROM STANDARDIZATION CAN BE DERIVED FROM BOTH LOWER UNIT COSTS FOR THE SELECTED SYSTEM AND LOWER LOGISTIC AND SUPPORT COSTS. WE WOULD INTEND THAT THESE SAVINGS BE APPLIED TO FUND GREATER FORCE IMPROVEMENTS. IN SOME CASES THE ALLIANCE MAY WISH

TO CHOOSE HIGHER MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AS THE CRITERIA FOR DECIDING ON A SPECIFIC ITEM RATHER THAN LOWER UNIT COST. IN SUCH CASES THE ECONOMIC PAYOFF FROM STANDARDIZATION MAY COME FROM LOWERED LOGISTIC AND SUPPORT COSTS RATHER THAN INITIAL PROCUREMENT COSTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 176498

C. LONG-TERM COMMITMENT. PARTICIPANTS MUST PERCEIVE STANDARDIZATION OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN THE ALLIANCE AS A LONG-TERM COMMITMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO PROVIDE FOR CONTINUING WORK IN THIS AREA. IF MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE VIEW STANDARDIZATION AS ONLY A TRANSITORY PHASE, THE WILLINGNESS TO MAKE MAJOR CONCESSIONS FOR ANTICIPATED FUTURE RETURNS WILL BE UNDERMINED.

D. MAINTAIN NATIONAL BASIS OF SUPPORT. IN THE PROCESS OF ACHIEVING GREATER STANDARDIZATION, THERE IS NO INTENT TO ELIMINATE THE NATIONAL CHARACTER OF NATO DEFENSE FORCES. EACH NATION WILL CONTINUE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR FIELDING AND SUPPORTING ITS OWN FORCES. WE MUST BE CAREFUL TO CONTINUE SUPPORT FOR THOSE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS IN EACH COUNTRY WHICH PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR ADEQUATE BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS FOR PROCUREMENT AND FORCE LEVELS. WE DO NOT FORESEE COUNTRIES DELEGATING MAJOR DEFENSE FUNDING DECISIONS TO SOME SUPRANATIONAL AUTHORITY. INDEED, UNLESS EACH NATION IS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION, THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY MAINTAINING MILITARY BUDGET LEVELS, PARTICULARLY IN THE FACE OF COMPETING CIVIL DEMANDS. STANDARDIZATION SHOULD BE PERCEIVED AS FACILITATING RATHER THAN CHALLENGING THE DISCHARGE OF NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

E. THE TWO-WAY STREET. THE US AND EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE WILL CONTINUE TO PRODUCE MOST TYPES OF MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS WITH OR WITHOUT STANDARDIZATION. WITH GREATER STANDARDIZATION IN NATO, PRODUCTION WOULD BE LARGE ENOUGH IN MOST CASES TO JUSTIFY TWO PRODUCTION LINES PRO-

DUCING THE SAME SYSTEM, ONE ON EACH SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC. ONE COULD ENVISAGE PROTOTYPE COMPETITION OPEN TO BOTH US AND EUROPEAN DEVELOPERS, OR US-EUROPEAN CONSORTIA, FOLLOWED BY COMMON PRODUCTION OF THE WINNING SYSTEM. ANY ARRANGEMENT FOR SETTling ON ONE STANDARD SYSTEM MUST PROVIDE FOR REWARD TO THE WINNER WITHOUT EXCESSIVELY PENALIZING THE LOSERS, PERHAPS LICENSE FEES AND APPROPRIATE SHARING OF THIRD COUNTRY SALES WOULD BE A METHOD FOR ACCOMPLISHING THIS. THE RESULT SHOULD BE MORE EFFICIENT USE OF R&D FUNDS, ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN PRODUCTION, AND STANDARDIZATION.

PAGE 06 STATE 176498

STANDARDIZED EQUIPMENT. PRODUCTION OF SYSTEMS NOT REQUIRING

OR JUSTIFYING TWO PRODUCTION LINES SHOULD BE ALLOTTED EQUITABLY BETWEEN THE US AND EUROPE, MAKING USE OF CO-PRODUCTION OF SUB-SYSTEMS WHERE APPROPRIATE AND AN AGREED MECHANISM FOR ADJUSTING OVERALL MILITARY ACCOUNTS PERIODICALLY. ALTHOUGH IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT HAVING TWO OR MORE PRODUCERS SOMETIMES PRECLUDES THE ATTAINMENT OF MAXIMUM THEORETICAL SAVINGS FROM STANDARDIZATION, THE POLITICAL NEED TO MAINTAIN NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS IS ALSO AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION.

F. RATIONAL EUROPEAN DEFENSE PRODUCTION BASE. FOR STANDARDIZATION TO YIELD THE BENEFITS ANTICIPATED, THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF NATO PROBABLY WILL HAVE TO RATIONALIZE AND RESTRUCTURE THEIR R&D EFFORTS AND DEFENSE INDUSTRIES. RATHER THAN MAINTAIN MANY SMALL INDUSTRIES IN THE SAME FIELD, WITH INEFFICIENT PRODUCTION AND INADEQUATE CAPITALIZATION, LARGER PRODUCTION FACILITIES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED WHICH CAN REALIZE THE GAINS OF ECONOMY OF SCALE AND CAN PRODUCE FOR AN ATLANTIC MARKET. EUROGROUP COULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN MAKING THE NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED. IN SOME CASES THESE ADJUSTMENTS WILL BE PAINFUL AND REQUIRE A TRANSITION PERIOD TO IMPLEMENT. HOWEVER, IF STANDARDIZATION IS TO PRODUCE THE DESIRED RESULTS, IT MUST NOT BE USED TO PROP UP INEFFICIENT OR MARGINAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIES. THE PROSPECT OF ACCESS TO AN ATLANTIC-WIDE MARKET SHOULD BE UNDERSCORED TO THE EUROPEANS AS A STRONG INCENTIVE TO MAKE THE NECESSARY INVESTMENTS AND ADJUSTMENTS.

G. HARMONIZING WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS AND MILITARY DOCTRINE. SINCE WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS ARE BASED IN LARGE PART ON PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT AND THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH IT, MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND DOCTRINE HAVE HISTORICALLY CAUSED NATIONS TO SEEK DIFFERENT EQUIPMENT TO DO THE SAME BASIC JOB. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE STANDARDIZATION, GREATER EMPHASIS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HARMONIZING BASIC DOCTRINE TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT COMMON WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS FOR

FUTURE SYSTEMS.  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 176498

H. IDENTIFYING OPPORTUNITIES FOR STANDARDIZATION. AS A PART OF THE PLANNING FOR FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE AND RELATED MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, OPPORTUNITIES FOR STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY MUST BE IDENTIFIED SUFFICIENTLY EARLY TO ALLOW FAIR COMPETITION AND AGREEMENT ON COMMON OR INTEROPERABLE SYSTEMS. THE ALLIANCE MUST ORGANIZE THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPABILITY TO DEVELOP A LONG-TERM PLAN FOR R&D AND PROCUREMENT SCHEDULES SO THAT STANDARDIZATION INITIATIVES CAN BE STARTED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPOR-

TUNITY, BEFORE COUNTRIES ARE FORCED TO MAKE UNILATERAL DECISIONS OR THE VESTING OF INTEREST PRECLUDES FLEXIBILITY. SUCH A PLAN COULD NOT BE BINDING, OF COURSE, BUT WOULD SERVE AS A ROAD MAP. RATHER THAN AN IDEAL PLAN, IT WOULD BE A USABLE COMPILATION OF COUNTRY PLANS PERMITTING POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS. THE BURDEN OF JUSTIFICATION SHOULD BE PLACED ON ANY COUNTRY THAT OPTS FOR A NON-STANDARD SYSTEM. THE LONG-TERM PLANNING ALREADY COMPLETED OR CURRENTLY UNDERWAY IN NATO, AS WELL AS THE WORK BY EURO-LONGTERM, MIGHT BE DRAWN ON AS APPROPRIATE.

### III. MAJOR ACTORS AND ROLES

7. AS WE MOVE AHEAD ON STANDARDIZATION, WE WILL BE CONFRONTED BY THE NEED TO MAKE CHOICES ON INSTITUTIONS THROUGH WHICH TO WORK. THE US HAS OFFICIALLY BEEN ENGAGED BY THE EUROGROUP IN ITS PROPOSAL FOR PRODUCTION AND PROCUREMENT. WE FAVOR DEVELOPING A LONG-TERM STANDARDIZATION MECHANISM WHICH INCLUDES FRANCE, BOTH BECAUSE OF THE QUALITY AND SIZE OF HER WEAPONS INDUSTRY AND ALSO BECAUSE OF THE SPOILING ROLE FRANCE COULD PLAY IF LEFT OUT. WHILE CONTINUING TO WORK WITH THE EUROGROUP, WE ARE ALSO CONSIDERING INTRODUCING OUR VIEWS IN THE NAC WHERE FRANCE CAN PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE RESULTANT EXCHANGES.

A. NATO. NATO ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMITTEES SHOULD SERVE TO COORDINATE AND FACILITATE STANDARDIZATION, WHILE INDIVIDUAL ALLIES OR GROUPS OF ALLIES RETAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR SPECIFIC PROGRAMS. NATO COULD SERVE AS A CLEARINGHOUSE FOR COORDINATING MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND PROVIDE  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 176498

NATIONS WITH AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMPOSITE CHARACTERISTICS AND QUANTITY REQUIRED OF FUTURE WEAPONS SYSTEMS ON A NATO-WIDE BASIS. WHILE THE CNAD AND OTHER NATO BODIES SHOULD CONTINUE WITH THE VARIOUS STANDARDIZATION TASKS THEY HAVE UNDERWAY, THE FOCUS OF POLICY DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE THE

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC).

B. EUROGROUP AND THE EC-9. EUROGROUP PROVIDES A USEFUL MECHANISM FOR COOPERATION, AND MAY PROVE TO BE THE BEST AVAILABLE. BECAUSE OF THE FRENCH PROBLEM, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT IDENTIFYING THE EUROGROUP IN ITS PRESENT FORM -- OR ANY OTHER SPECIFIC EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTALITY -- AS OUR CHOSEN PARTNER IN COOPERATION. WE SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT OUR ULTIMATE GOAL IS TO WORK IN NATO WITH THE OTHER ALLIES AND THAT IT IS UP TO THEM TO DECIDE ON THE NUMBER OF VOICES WITH WHICH THEY SPEAK. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE WILL LIKELY REFLECT HOW FAR THEY ARE PREPARED TO GO IN RATIONALIZING THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE INDUSTRIES. WE MUST CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE

TO THE EUROPEANS THAT WE WILL NOT ACCEPT INCREASED COST AND INEFFICIENCY AS THE PRICE FOR COOPERATION AND STANDARDIZATION. WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE EUROGROUP, AND PERHAPS THE EC-9 OR SOME OTHER BODY, COULD ASSIST IN RATIONALIZING EUROPEAN DEFENSE INDUSTRIES THROUGH INTEGRATION AND MERGING OF MARGINAL ENTERPRISES. HOWEVER, WE NEED TO BEAR IN MIND THAT A NEW FORM OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN THIS AREA COULD DEROGATE FROM NATO'S TRADITIONAL ROLE IN THE DEFENSE FIELD, COULD SEPARATE NATO MEMBERS, OR COULD DEVELOP SOME FORM OF ADVERSARY ATTITUDE TOWARD THE US.

IV. STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY ACTIVITIES UNDERWAY IN NATO

8. AT THE MOMENT THERE ARE FOUR MAJOR STREAMS OF ACTIVITY WORKING TOWARD STANDARDIZATION IN NATO.

A. CNAD TASK OF SELECTING MAJOR AREAS FOR EMPHASIS. SOME CURRENT AREAS OF CNAD EMPHASIS ARE AWACS, OTHER AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS, SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW RIFLE FOR THE 1980'S, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, SECOND  
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 176498

GENERATION ANTI-SHIP MISSILE, AND INTEROPERABILITY AND SECURITY OF COMMUNICATIONS. ALSO, THE US, FRG, AND UK HAVE INSTITUTED A TANK GUN COMPETITION ON A TRILATERAL BASIS, AND THE US AND FRG ARE PLANNING A MAIN BATTLE TANK COMPETITION.

B. INTEROPERABILITY. THE US HAS ASKED NATO, AS PART OF THE US RESPONSE TO THE NUNN AMENDMENT ON STANDARDIZATION, TO IDENTIFY HOW MILITARY CAPABILITIES WOULD BE IMPROVED WITH GREATER INTEROPERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT SHORT OF STANDARDIZED MAJOR SYSTEMS, AND TO FORM AN AD HOC GROUP TO ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR EXPEDITING INTEROPERABILITY ACTIONS.

C. EUROGROUP INITIATIVE. THE EUROGROUP HAS PROPOSED THAT THERE BE A MORE EQUITABLE BALANCE IN PROCUREMENT OF ARMAMENTS AND MATERIEL BETWEEN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA. THE EUROGROUP IS SCHEDULED TO MEET ON THIS SUBJECT AND PREPARE A LIST OF CANDIDATE WEAPONS FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN ALLIES TO PROCURE FROM EUROPE. THIS SHOULD BE A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION AT THE DECEMBER 1975 DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING.

D. FOUR POWER GROUP. THE FOUR-POWER GROUP (US, UK, FR AND FRG), REPRESENTING THE BULK OF ALLIANCE RESOURCES AND R&D EFFORTS, HAS BEEN OPERATING AS AN INFORMAL WORKING BODY TO GENERATE AND ACCOMPLISH SPECIFIC STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY ACTIONS. THE PRINCIPALS OF THE FOUR-POWER

GROUP MEET INFORMALLY EVERY SIX MONTHS, PRIOR TO CNAD, AND THEIR DEPUTIES MEET EVERY THREE MONTHS. DECISION SCHEDULES FOR INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS ARE EXCHANGED, ALONG WITH VIEWS TOWARD CANCELLATION OF PLANNED PROGRAMS IN FAVOR OF ADOPTING A COMMON SOLUTION. ADDITIONALLY, CNAD ONGOING AND PROPOSED INITIATIVES ARE DISCUSSED, AND COMMON POSITIONS EVOLVED.

9. TENTATIVE PROGRAM OF ACTION. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND OF PRINCIPLES AND CURRENT ACTIVITIES, THE FOLLOWING PROGRAM OF ACTION IS UNDER CONSIDERATION:

A. CONSULTATIONS IN NAC. IN FOLLOWING UP THE SUMMIT DISCONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 10 STATE 176498

CUSSIONS, THE NAC SHOULD BEGIN TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS ON THE ESSENTIAL BASES FOR STANDARDIZATION WITH THE TWIN AIMS OF FAMILIARIZING THE NATO PERMREPS AND THEIR GOVERNMENTS WITH THE BASIC CONCEPTS, PROBLEMS, AND OPPORTUNITIES OF STANDARDIZATION, AND OF REACHING A CONSENSUS ON THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY WHICH THE ALLIANCE SHOULD ADOPT ON THE SUBJECT. WE WOULD EXPECT THIS DISCUSSION TO FOCUS ON THE POINTS MENTIONED IN PARA 6A-H ABOVE.

B. STEERING COMMITTEE. TO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE NAC, WE SEE THE NEED FOR A STEERING COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY REPORTING TO THE NAC. FRENCH PARTICIPATION SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED, HOWEVER, LINKAGE TO OTHER NATO BODIES ACTIVELY ENGAGED WITH STANDARDIZATION SHOULD NOT BE SACRIFICED TO THIS END. IN ONE APPROACH, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL MIGHT BE THE CHAIRMAN AND THE ASG (DEFENSE SUPPORT) THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN. MEMBERS WOULD INCLUDE NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MC AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION, WITH OTHER ASG'S PARTICIPATING AS APPROPRIATE. ANOTHER APPROACH MIGHT BE TO ADAPT THE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES THAT WERE USED TO GOOD ADVANTAGE WITH AD-70 STUDIES. WE ARE ESPECIALLY ATTRACTED TO THE VIEWS AND POINTS (REF B)



ON THE NEED FOR A CLEAR CUT "INTERMEDIATE DIMENSION" AND SEE THE ADVISOR EXECUTIVE GROUP THAT IS CURRENTLY UNDER EXPLORATION (REF A) AS A POTENTIAL MANAGEMENT CATALYST FOR TANGIBLE PROGRESS. THE STEERING COMMITTEE SHOULD DRAFT A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR STANDARDIZATION AS WELL AS A DRAFT REPORT ON ONGOING ALLIANCE ACTIVITIES ON STANDARDIZATION. THE NAC AND DPC MINISTERIAL MEETINGS WOULD HOLD DISCUSSIONS ON THE ESSENTIAL BASES FOR STANDARDIZATION IN DECEMBER 1975. MINISTERS THEN WOULD BE ASKED TO AUTHORIZE THE PERREPS TO DRAW UP A PLAN OF ACTION FOR STANDARDIZATION WITHIN NATO.

C. REINFORCED NAC MEETING. OTHER POSSIBLE STEPS COULD INCLUDE A REINFORCED NAC MEETING IN THE SPRING OF 1976, INCLUDING STATE, DEFENSE, AND TREASURY POLICY OFFICIALS, TO DEAL WITH OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE STANDARDIZATION PLAN FOR RATIFICATION, IF POSSIBLE, AT NATO'S MINISTERIAL MEETINGS LATER IN THE SPRING. THE RESULTING PLAN SHOULD CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 11 STATE 176498

SERVE AS GUIDANCE TO MAKE STANDARDIZATION A LONG-TERM PROGRAM, AND COULD BE FOLLOWED AS APPROPRIATE BY HIGHER LEVEL MEETINGS.

D. ANNUAL REVIEW. ON THE BASIS OF THE PRECEDING WORK, ESTABLISH AN ANNUAL REVIEW PROCEDURE, MODELED AFTER THE CURRENT ANNUAL REVIEW OF COUNTRY FORCE PLANS OR BUILT INTO THAT SAME REVIEW, AIMED AT EXAMINING PROGRESS IN STANDARDIZATION AND PRODUCING A STANDARDIZATION IMPACT STATEMENT FOR EACH NATION AND FOR THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.

10. THE FOREGOING CONSTITUTES OUR PRELIMINARY THINKING ONLY. MISSION COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS ARE REQUESTED. INFO ADDRESSEES ARE ENCOURAGED TO OFFER COMMENTS AS WELL. KISSINGER

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 26 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ALLIANCE, STANDARDS, REPORTS, COLLECTIVE SECURITY, DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 25 JUL 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** ShawDG  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975STATE176498  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** PM/ISP:ARTURRENTINE:DLJ  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** D750259-0192  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t197507106/baaaaqig.tel  
**Line Count:** 472  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN PM  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 9  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** ShawDG  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 30 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <30 APR 2003 by MartinML>; APPROVED <23 DEC 2003 by ShawDG>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** n/a  
**TAGS:** MCAP, MILI, PFOR, NATO  
**To:** NATO INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR  
USLOSACLANT  
CINCLANT  
**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006